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German packaging waste management: 
a successful voluntary agreement with less successful environmental effects 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Duales System Deutschland (DSD) is an association of the German packag-
ing industry to collect, sort and recycle packaging waste from consumers. While 
it can be called a ‘voluntary agreement’, it was established in response to the 
regulatory threat of the German Packaging Ordinance to impose individual col-
lection and recycling duties for every packaging producer and distributor. The 
DSD fulfils most of the conditions for a successful voluntary agreement. Ger-
man packaging waste management is less successful in its environmental ef-
fects, however, as it prioritises recycling over waste avoidance. Whereas avoid-
ance can save the full resource and energy content of economised packages, re-
cycling leads to a partial recovery of the natural resources and energy embod-
ied in waste packages only. The EU Packaging Waste Directive follows the basic 
principle of the German Packaging Ordinance and similar systems as DSD have 
been established in other European countries. There is the danger that a specific 
form of packaging waste management becomes locked in which sets free an 
innovative potential for recycling technologies, but neglects a similar potential 
for waste avoidance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If Voluntary Agreements (VAs) were really ‘unforced by law and unpersuaded 
by financial incentives’, as an often quoted definition would have it (Jacobs 
1991, p. 134), then few agreements could really be called voluntary. Instead, 
VAs often come about as the response of the private sector to the threat by pub-
lic authorities to introduce binding, i.e. non-voluntary, regulation. In other 
words: the private sector swallows the bitter pill of self-regulation in order to 
fight off the even more dreadful medicine of binding public regulation. In real-
ity, therefore, one can observe a plethora of VAs with a varying degree of im-
pact of public authorities (Sinclair 1997). 
A prime example of a VA that is voluntary in nothing but its name is the Du-
ales System Deutschland AG (DSD), an association of the German packaging 
industry set up for the purpose of collecting, sorting and recycling packaging 
waste. Formally, the DSD is a voluntary association: it originated in the private 
sector and no packaging company can be forced to join it. In substance, how-
ever, its installation was the only chance for the industry to escape the individual 
duty of every producer and distributor of packages to collect used consumption 
good packages from the consumer and recycle them. According to §6 section 3 
of the initial German Packaging Ordinance (Verpackungsverordnung) from 1991, 
this individual duty could only be waived if from 1st of January 1993 onwards 
the industry as a whole provided a system in its own responsibility that would 
guarantee the collection of packaging waste from all consumers and would ful-
fil certain quotas of collection, sorting and recycling. 
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In its first and major part, this article provides a critical assessment of the 
DSD. In its second part it discusses the wider European Union policy context 
with regard to packaging waste. To do so is imperative as the European Union 
Packaging Waste Directive 94/62/EC follows the same basic idea as the Ger-
man Ordinance. In short, the article argues that while the DSD fulfils most of 
the conditions for a successful voluntary agreement, it has been much less suc-
cessful in its environmental effects. This is because it prioritises recycling of 
packaging waste over waste avoidance. Neither the DSD nor the underlying 
Packaging Ordinance has set up any significant provisions for the avoidance of 
packaging waste. 
In addition to publicly available documents, the article is based on non-
standardised interviews undertaken with representatives from DSD, the Ger-
man federal environment ministry and the Bund für Umwelt- und Naturschutz, 
which has a specifically national focus and is the biggest German environ-
mental pressure group apart from Greenpeace. These interviews were merely 
undertaken to gain information and insights, which were not readily accessible 
otherwise, and no pretence of representativity is made here. 
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DUALES SYSTEM DEUTSCHLAND: A SUCCESSFUL VA 
While VAs usually are the instrument for environmental management pre-
ferred by the private sector1, environmentalists are often less enthusiastic about 
them (Jenkins 1995; European Environment Agency 1997, p. 50). Their major 
concern is that VAs might lead to a watering down of environmental protection 
standards. Game theoretic analysis by Segerson and Miceli (1998) and Schmel-
zer (1999) shows that under certain conditions the environmental standard ne-
gotiated in a VA will always be less than the standard that would be imposed 
via binding public regulation. Additionally, Bizer (1999) argues that VAs are 
often agree upon by the private sector to buy time and to delay more substan-
tial environmental protection measures into the distant future.. On the other 
hand, there do exist VAs that seem to function quite successfully and do not 
appear to come about at the expense of environmental standards (Bizer and 
Jülich 1999). 
For a VA to be successful, it has to fulfil a number of conditions, however. 
The most common ones to be found in the relevant literature can be summa-
rised as follows (see, for example, Preimesberger 1997; European Environment 
Agency 1997; Rennings et al. 1996; SRU 1998; Bizer and Jülich 1999): 
 
                                                 
1 But see Eden (1997) for the notable exception of the UK packaging industry. 
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• the targets need to be clear and transparent and in a quantitative form. The 
targets must cover the long-term, but intermediate goals need to be set up as 
well. 
• the targets themselves must not be the object of the VA. Otherwise easily 
achieved targets are set up that are often nothing more but the codification 
of future business as usual projections.2 
• compliance with the agreement as a whole needs to be ensured via backdrop 
regulatory threats. 
• external and internal free-riding needs to be deterred: no relevant compa-
nies may stay outside the agreement and companies that sign up to the 
agreement must also follow its obligations. 
• the agreement needs to be monitored, supervised and verified and the 
evaluation made public. 
 
The DSD fulfils most, if not all, of these conditions for a successful VA: 
• First, the German Packaging Ordinance and its amendments lay down 
quantitative targets for how much of a given type of packaging has to be re-
covered, that is, recycled (only in the case of plastics up to 40% of the col-
lected packaging waste can be incinerated instead of recycled). See table 1 
for an overview.  
                                                 
2 As examples for this, see the German industry’s ‘Declaration on Global Warming Prevention’ 
(Kristof and Ramesohl 1999) and many of the VAs in Denmark (Neale 1997). 
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< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE > 
 
• Second, the targets are set exogenous to the DSD. They are set by the federal 
government (Bundesregierung) with the approval of the federal parliament 
(Bundestag) and the chamber of state governments (Bundesrat). Of course, 
lobbying takes place for ‘soft’ targets. Intensive lobbying achieved, for ex-
ample, that the targets set in the original Packaging Ordinance from 1991 
and as amended in 1993 were lowered in retrospect for 1996 in the 1998 
amendment, as the targets had not been achieved. Whereas with respect to 
paper/cardboard, glass and aluminium these targets might not have been 
much stricter than what the industry would have found profitable to 
achieve in any case (SRU 1998, p. 211), at least with respect to plastics the 
German packaging industry had to engage in substantial investments to 
provide the infrastructure for packaging waste collection and recovery — 
see table 2 for an overview of costs. At least with respect to plastics, but to 
some extent for other packaging types as well, the DSD cannot therefore be 
denounced as undertaking something under the disguise of VA, which the 
packaging industry would have done anyway. Further evidence for this 
stems from the fact that several earlier attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to 
persuade the packaging sector to increase recycling rates failed because no 
alternative binding regulation was threatened (BUND 1988, p. 6; Rennings 
et al. 1996, p. 248). 
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< INSERT TABLE 2 HERE > 
 
• Third, the Packaging Ordinance and its amendments ensure compliance via 
backdrop regulatory threats. §6 section 4 of the Ordinance threatens to recall 
the exemption from individual collection and recycling duties if the collec-
tive system, i.e. the DSD, fails to ensure collection from all consumers and 
recycling of packages according to the collective quotas in table 1. A special 
rule applies to beverage packages. According to §8 section 2 of the Ordi-
nance the share of re-usable beverage packages must not drop below 72%. If 
it does and continues to do so for a period of 12 months after the official an-
nouncement of the failure to reach the target, then the federal government 
threatens to introduce a compulsory deposit-refund system for those bever-
ages for which the target was missed. While these mechanisms appear to be 
cumbersome, a clear regulatory threat for non-compliance is existent at 
least.3 As such, the DSD is different from many other VAs in Germany 
                                                 
3 Possibly there will soon be a test whether the threat of a compulsory deposit-refund system is 
credible: for the first time the 72% target was not reached in 1997. This failure is mainly due to 
the strongly increasing use of non-reusable beer cans at the expense of reusable glass bottles. 
Between February 1999 and January 2000 fulfilment of the target is re-examined. Federal envi-
ronment minister Jürgen Trittin has threatened to introduce a compulsory deposit-refund sys-
tem for beer and mineral water in case of renewed failure to reach the target (Trittin 1999). 
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which are of an informal nature and do not include sanctions for non-
compliance (European Environment Agency 1997, p. 29). 
• Fourth, free-riding has been successfully deterred by now. The DSD had 
enormous problems in the beginning with companies who did not join the 
DSD, did not pay the fees for packaging waste collection and recycling, but 
nevertheless used the so-called Green Dot, a special mark printed on pack-
ages with which packagers signalled their membership of DSD. Rennings et 
al. (1996, p. 261) estimate that up to 40% of packages with the Green Dot 
originated from free-riders. This problem has now been successfully tackled 
by more stringent controls through DSD. Another free-riding problem was 
that some companies refused to use the Green Dot and thereby refused to 
join the collective system, declaring that they would collect and recycle their 
packaging waste individually. In reality, however, consumers did not check 
whether packaging waste carried the Green Dot or not and disposed all 
waste into the facilities provided by DSD without discrimination. As a con-
sequence, companies that refused to join the collective system could in effect 
get away without providing an alternative individual system. This 
prompted DSD to call for binding public regulation to deter this kind of 
free-riding. In August 1998 a new Packaging Ordinance came into force that 
requires companies which do not license their packaging with DSD to meet 
by 2000 the same recycling targets as DSD and demands detailed documen-
tation and proof for this. As a consequence, free-riding has all but vanished. 
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• Fifth, monitoring, supervision and verification is minutely regulated. Ac-
cording to Annex 2 of the Ordinance, the DSD has to document for each 
type of packaging waste how much packaging has been produced, how 
much has been taken back from consumers and how much of it has been re-
cycled. This documentation needs to be verified by an independent expert or 
environmental assessor and is made public. 
 
 
LESS SUCCESSFUL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
Given that the DSD fulfils most, if not all, conditions for a successful VA, it 
might be tempting to presume that it has also been successful in achieving sig-
nificant environmental improvements in the packaging waste sector. Such a 
presumption would be overhasty, however. To start with, the system of packag-
ing waste collection and recycling is very expensive. As can be seen from table 
2, it costs the German economy around 4 billion DM per year (approximately 
£1.3 billion). This represents a very high cost indeed, even if costs (expressed as 
licence fees paid by members of DSD) in 1999 were reduced by 9.5% and DSD 
promises further reductions in the future (Brück 1999).4 These high costs are 
problematic for two reasons: first, in a world of scarce resources and therefore 
limited willingness and ability to pay for environmental improvements, money 
that is spent on one purpose is lost for another. Given that packaging waste 
                                                 
4 The licence fee reduction led to a decrease of costs in per capita terms from about £17 to £15. 
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represents merely about 24% of all household waste which in turn represents 
only about 13% of all waste in Germany, about 4 billion DM are spent on han-
dling a mere 3% of overall waste (Statistisches Bundesamt 1996). Indeed, as the 
majority of costs accrue with respect to the recycling of but one fraction of 
packaging waste, namely plastics, the cost efficiency of achieving environ-
mental benefits is rather dubious. Second, there is widespread uncertainty 
about the actual environmental improvements the DSD has brought about. Any 
environmentally benign effect from packaging waste collection and recycling 
must stem from either savings in landfill space and incineration capacities or in 
reductions in energy and natural resource use for the otherwise ‘necessary’ 
production of new packages.5 With respect to the first aspect, DSD collects 
around 5 million tonnes of packaging waste each year, which reduces pressures 
on landfill and incineration facilities (DSD various years). On the other hand, 
the severe shortages in these facilities from the late 1980s and early 1990s have 
now given way to over-capacities, especially as concerns waste incineration, so 
that this aspect does not play such an important role any longer (SRU 1998). 
With respect to the second aspect, some of the natural resources and the energy 
embodied in the packages can be recovered via recycling, even if energy and 
                                                 
5 In the case of plastic, part of the positive environmental effects can stem from a recovery of its 
energy content via incineration. 
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natural resources are needed for the collection, sorting and recycling of packag-
ing waste.6 
The question remains, however, whether an alternative packaging waste 
management policy could not lead to a higher reduction of natural resource and 
energy use at the same or even at lower cost. From an environmental perspec-
tive, the greatest reduction potential lies in the avoidance of waste rather than 
in waste collection and recycling (Kopytziok 1992). Recycling can only partially 
recover the resources and the energy embodied in the recycled packages. Re-
sources and energy are consumed in the process of collecting, transporting, 
processing, marketing and using the recycled materials. Given that ecologically 
committed scholars and environmental activists usually postulate reductions in 
resource and energy use by a factor of 4 as a target over the next 50 years or so 
(Ayres and Simonis 1994; Weizsäcker et al. 1996; Friends of the Earth 1999), it 
seems impossible to contribute substantially to reaching such an ambitious goal 
with an emphasis on recycling rather than avoidance of waste. Furthermore, 
pollution is produced at various stages of the recycling process. For example, 
the recycling of aluminium produces substantial amounts of slag, which is con-
taminated with toxic metals and dioxines. The so-called de-inking of recycled 
paper causes contaminated sewage mud. Lastly, materials cannot be endlessly 
                                                 
6 Unfortunately, there does not exist any comprehensive study quantifying the savings in en-
ergy and natural resources due to DSD. For the Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutsch-
land, it is one of its major critiques that DSD does not have to document the environmental ef-
fects of its system of collecting, sorting and recycling. 
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recycled. For example, the fibre length of paper is reduced in each cycle of recy-
cling such that the fibres become too short and new cellulose has to be added. 
In terms of avoidance the DSD’s performance is rather poor, however. Ad-
mittedly, it is not completely lacking incentives for avoidance. First, as every 
package carries a licence fee, the DSD leads to an implicit price rise for packag-
ing, which decreases its consumption. Second, the licence fees are not only dif-
ferentiated according to the weight and either the volume or the surface of a 
package, but also according to the type of package in that the respective recy-
cling cost has some impact on the licence fee. Because of the differentiated li-
cence fee structure there is a relative price incentive to substitute easily recycla-
ble packages for ones that are more difficult to recycle.7 According to Wolfgang 
Brück, president of DSD, consumption of packages in Germany decreased by 13 
percent between 1991 and 1998 (Brück 1999). How much of this reduction can 
be attributed to DSD is unclear, however, for two reasons. First, the amount of 
waste more generally has stagnated or slightly decreased in Germany from 
1990 onwards (Statistisches Bundesamt 1996; Ewers et al. 1997). Second, accord-
ing to DSD figures the major reductions in packaging consumption have oc-
curred early on in the period between 1991 and 1998, so that DSD, which came 
into effect in 1993, cannot be credited with achieving the full reduction. 
                                                 
7 Critics argue, however, that in order to become environmentally more effective, the licence 
fees would need to reflect more strongly the relative differences in difficulty to recycle certain 
packaging types. On this, see the federal environment minister’s proposal that licence fees 
should better reflect ecological aspects, which is discussed further below. 
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What is beyond doubt is that the packaging waste collection and recycling 
system as represented by DSD does not give the same weight to waste avoid-
ance as it gives to recycling, let alone prioritises avoidance.8 In many respects it 
rather encourages the consumption of packaging, which is contrary to the sol-
emn declarations by both the packaging industry and former federal environ-
ment minister Angela Merkel that the Packaging Ordinance and DSD put em-
phasis on waste avoidance (AG Verpackung und Umwelt 1990; Merkel 1998). 
The ‘Green Dot’, its characteristic feature, suggests to consumers that in their 
consumption they need not worry about the accompanying packaging waste, as 
it will be recycled rather than disposed of.9 It might thus in the first place lead 
to a decrease in environmental concern of consumers about the overall amount 
of packaging production and therefore, ceteris paribus, to an increase in its con-
sumption. Already in 1990, the German Council of Environmental Advisors 
(Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen) foresaw in a special report on waste man-
agement the danger that the DSD would not contribute to the desired avoid-
ance of waste at the point of origin (SRU 1990, p. 4). The DSD might thus well 
be in conflict with the fundamental norm in §4 of the German Product Recy-
cling and Waste Management Act from 1994 (Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallge-
                                                 
8 Partly, this is because the German electricity supply industry took over substantial parts of the 
packaging and other waste management infrastructure in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(Anonymous 1989a, 1989b). These pressure groups supported prioritising recycling as this 
would guarantee profits to their investments. 
9 The colour green was selected on purpose, of course. 
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setz) which gives priority to waste avoidance over recycling and incineration (or 
energetic utilisation (energetische Verwertung) as incineration is called somewhat 
euphemistically in the Act). 
In some sense, of course, one could argue that the DSD, whose major pur-
pose is recycling, is the wrong target for blame with respect to the failure of 
substantial packaging waste avoidance. Following this argument, it is the Pack-
aging Ordinance itself or even the wider German policy with respect to packag-
ing waste management that is fundamentally flawed. In my view, such an ar-
gument suggests a deceptive separateness of issues, however, as DSD is the ma-
jor component of the Packaging Ordinance and the cornerstone of German 
packaging waste management. Nevertheless, this argument has merit in putting 
emphasis on analysing the wider context in which DSD operates. As a next step, 
it is therefore appropriate to look at the future of packaging waste management 
in Germany. 
 
 
THE FUTURE OF PACKAGING WASTE MANAGEMENT IN GERMANY 
There are basically four possible options. One is to keep the system basically as 
it is now with small amendments. For example, Germany’s federal environment 
minister Jürgen Trittin has proposed that the structure of licence fees that DSD 
charges to the producers of packages should reflect ecological aspects more 
strongly (Trittin 1999). In other words, the relative price for packages that are 
difficult to recycle or are intensive in resource and energy consumption should 
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increase. For example, at the moment all plastic carries the same fee, but some 
types of plastic are easier to recycle than others. Such a strategy is likely to 
make DSD somewhat more environmentally friendly, but will not lead to any 
substantial avoidance of packaging waste. For the special case of beverage con-
tainers, it is unclear whether the deposit-refund system, that is threatened to 
come into effect if the quota of reusable packages persistently falls short of 72%, 
will be environmentally beneficial. Instead, it might even further increase the 
use of non-reusable cans and thereby defeat its original purpose. This is because 
a mandatory deposit-refund system on cans suggests environmental friendli-
ness to consumers who might no longer be able to distinguish between the dif-
ferent environmental effects of non-reusable and reusable systems and might 
prefer the lighter and more easily transportable cans to the heavier glass bottles. 
The mandatory deposit-refund system might thus very well defeat its own pur-
pose of encouraging the use of reusable packages. This is a fundamental flaw 
symptomatic of a system that is hostile towards levying taxes on or banning 
non-reusable packages where alternatives exist. 
The second option also keeps the system basically as it is now, but tries to re-
duce its costs in taking small and difficult to recycle packaging waste, especially 
plastics, out of the system’s coverage. These types of packaging wastes would 
be labelled with a Red Dot instead of the Green Dot in order to signal to con-
sumers that these should be disposed of with the normal household waste and 
should not be put into the facilities provided by DSD. This proposal has been 
around for some time already (SRU 1998, p. 211). Because consumers have in 
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the past not distinguished between packaging waste that carried or did not 
carry the Green Dot, it seems unrealistic to expect that consumers would distin-
guish between packaging that carries the Green or the Red Dot, however. Apart 
from the practical feasibility of this option, its environmental soundness is open 
to question as well. It would cancel out the ongoing progress that is being 
achieved with automatic sorting technology and innovative recycling tech-
niques for these types of packaging waste. DSD (1999b) expects that ‘fully 
automatic sorting technology will be the norm in the German waste disposal 
industry by the middle of the next decade’ and that the ‘problem of packaging 
that is “difficult to recycle” or small will therefore resolve itself from a technical 
point of view’. 
The third option is to keep the system of recycling, but to introduce along-
side strong fiscal or regulatory incentives for waste avoidance. This could be 
achieved via a general tax on packages, via especially high taxes on non-
reusable packages where reusable alternatives exist as in the case of beverages 
or even via an outright ban of certain environmentally unfriendly packages. 
Eco-balances undertaken by the German Federal Environmental Agency (Um-
weltbundesamt) show that reusable packaging for beverages is in general ecol-
ogically superior to non-reusable packaging, especially if the packaging is stan-
dardised and the beverages come from regional production (Umweltbundesamt 
1996). This third policy option would be explicitly directed at waste avoidance 
and is likely to lead to the strongest reductions in packaging waste and in the 
consumption of resources and energy. It is doubtful, however, whether such a 
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strategy would be consistent with European Union law. The EU and its Com-
mission have so far been rather hostile towards the banning of certain packages 
(see the next section below). 
The fourth option is to abandon all recycling targets and to abolish the DSD 
as a collective system. Such a position is held by some economists who call for a 
clearly market-oriented approach towards packaging waste management and 
regard the DSD as a major hindrance towards achieving free markets in the 
waste sector.10 According to Ewers and Tegner (1998, p. 3) the government 
should not determine how much waste is produced, avoided or recycled. The 
only thing it should do is to ensure that all externalities of waste disposal are 
internalised. The presumption is that the price signals following from internali-
sation will work their way backwards through all markets and will lead to the 
efficient level of waste production, avoidance and recycling via the invisible 
hand of the market. Such a position ignores, however, that very often a full in-
ternalisation of externalities is impossible because of uncertainty and ignorance 
about the complex effects of pollutants on ecosystems (Neumayer 1999, pp. 98-
102). The identification and monitoring of environmental hazards and their as-
signment to specific pollutants is often impossible. Furthermore, such a position 
ignores the fact that the major problems of packaging waste are not environ-
                                                 
10It is also a position shared by the German Council of Environmental Advisors (Sachverständi-
genrat für Umweltfragen) (SRU 1998), which is not surprising as its member responsible for the 
waste sector (Prof. Hans-Jürgen Ewers) is one of the major proponents of the market-oriented 
approach (Ewers et al. 1997). 
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mental hazards in disposal, which are rather small, but the waste of scarce en-
ergy and natural resources in the process of packaging production, recycling or 
disposal. As this fourth option is not likely to lead to substantial waste avoid-
ance and potentially leads to lower recycling rates, it is the least preferred op-
tion from an environmental point of view. 
The first option is likely to characterise the future of packaging waste man-
agement. The second and the fourth option are unlikely because there is cur-
rently no political party in Germany that wants to go this way. Also, such an 
option would clash with Germany’s obligation to implement the European Un-
ion Packaging Waste Directive 94/62/EC, which prescribes the basic idea of the 
German Packaging Ordinance for all EU countries in setting minimum targets 
for packaging waste recovery (see below). 
The third option is also not likely to become reality. Any further fiscal or 
regulatory interventions in the packaging sector would face furious hostility by 
the packaging sector. After all, it has originally agreed on the DSD merely to 
fight off more far-reaching regulation. While environmentalists and possibly 
minority factions of the ruling Social Democratic and Green parties could sup-
port this option, it is unlikely that they could gain a majority within their party, 
let alone convince the federal government to engage in a new conflict with the 
industry. 
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THE EUROPEAN UNION CONTEXT 
Turning to the wider European Union context, the most important policy inia-
tive has been the EU Packaging Waste Directive 94/62/EC. Similar to the basic 
idea of the German Packaging Ordinance, Article 6 of the Directive requires 
member countries to achieve a minimum target of 50% of packaging waste ma-
terials to be recovered from the waste stream no later than five years after im-
plementation of the Directive. An exemption to this general rule applies to 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, which are required to recover merely 25% ini-
tially and 50% only from 2006 onwards. Article 7 encourages the ‘participation 
of the economic operators of the sectors concerned’ and thus effectively encour-
ages the establishing of VAs for packaging waste treatment in the European 
Union member states. In Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain 
and Portugal the packaging sector has set up associations similar to the DSD. 
The DSD has played an active role in encouraging this process in transferring 
its copyright for the ‘Green Dot’ to the Packaging Recovery Organisation 
Europe (PRO EUROPE) in Brussels in December 1996, which in turn grants user 
rights to the mentioned associations outside Germany. According to DSD 
(1999a) around 212 million people in the European Union now consume goods 
that carry the ‘Green Dot’. To some extent, therefore, the German Packaging 
Ordinance and DSD functioned as a role model for the EU Directive and the 
developments in European packaging waste management. 
As with the German Ordinance, the Directive does not contain any substan-
tial incentives for packaging waste avoidance. Caps on the overall amount of 
21 
packaging waste were originally envisaged in a pre-draft of the Directive, but 
had to be cancelled due to opposition from member states and lobbying pres-
sure by the packaging sector (Golub 1996, p. 7 and 9). What remained in the 
Directive are non-binding statements such as ‘the best means of preventing the 
creation of packaging waste is to reduce the overall volume of packaging’ and 
the allowance for member states to ‘encourage reuse systems of packaging (...) 
in conformity with the Treaty’ in Article 5. That these provisions can hardly be 
considered more than vague phrases, can be inferred from the fact that the 
Commission regularly quarrels with member states, which actually try to en-
courage reuse systems of packaging. For example, the Commission has sent so-
called reasoned opinions to Germany regarding its Packaging Ordinance regu-
lations ‘which continue to promote the re-use of packaging materials’ and to 
Denmark ‘as metal cans for drinks and other types of non-reusable packaging 
are banned there’ (European Commission 1999, p. 32).11 
In many other respects, the Directive is even less environmentally friendly 
than the German Ordinance. The reason is that the Directive does not simply 
follow the German role model, but represents a compromise resulting from the 
differing policy concepts with respect to packaging waste management and the 
ensuing regulatory competition among member states. 
                                                 
11 Before the passing of the Packaging Waste Directive, the Commission had already in the 
1980s unsuccessfully challenged the Danish bottle recycling system in the European Court of 
Justice (Case No. 302/86). 
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First, in addition to the mentioned minimum targets, the Directive also sets a 
maximum target of 65% of packaging waste recovery. According to Article 6, 
para. 6, Member States can only set programmes going beyond this maximum 
target ‘on condition that these measures avoid distortions of the internal market 
and do not hinder compliance by other Member States with the Directive’. The 
motivation for these provisions stems from the adverse consequences the Ger-
man Packaging Ordinance initially had on other member states. At the very 
beginning of its existence, the DSD did not have sufficient national capacities to 
process the total amount of recycled packages that it was required to recycle 
according to the Ordinance. As a consequence, large amounts of recycled mate-
rials, mainly paper, were dumped in other EU countries and the Far East, caus-
ing angry reactions by foreign companies, especially in France and the United 
Kingdom (Biod, Probert and Jones 1994; Eden 1997, p. 234). The Commission 
feared that retaliatory measures by other EU member states and counter-
measures by Germany could potentially undermine the objective of the Single 
European Market and the Directive was an attempt to contain trade frictions 
among the member states with respect to recycled materials. Maybe even more 
than by environmental motives, the Directive was therefore triggered by con-
cern about the smooth functioning of the internal market. Further evidence for 
this is that the Directive is explicitly based on Article 100a of the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community, instead of Articles 130r to 130t. Whereas the 
latter articles encompass the environment chapter of the Treaty, the major ob-
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jective of Article 100a is the synchronisation of national legislation in order to 
remove and avoid internal barriers to trade. 
Second, contrary to the German Product Recycling and Waste Management 
Act, on which the amended Packaging Ordinance is based upon, the EU Direc-
tive, while paying lip service to preventing the creation of packaging waste, 
does not even contain a clear hierarchy of objectives and disposal methods in 
which the prevention of packaging waste ranks higher than recycling which in 
turn ranks higher than incineration. 
Third, and related to the last point, the Directive positively encourages the 
incineration of recovered packaging waste as an alternative to material recy-
cling. In this respect, it follows the French model of packaging waste manage-
ment (see Biod, Probert and Jones 1994). Article 6 of the Directive again sets a 
maximum target of 45% and a minimum target of 25% by weight of the totality 
of packaging material and a minimum target of 15% by weight of each packag-
ing material to be recycled. The rest is to be incinerated. As mentioned, the 
German Packaging Ordinance in contrast allows incineration for up to 40% of 
plastics only, all other recovered packaging waste needs to be recycled. A recent 
study by the Öko-Institut and the Deutsche Projekt Union (1999) aspires to 
demonstrate that material recycling is ecologically superior to incineration. 
Fourth, and more generally, the recovery and recycling targets set in the Di-
rective are commonly regarded as relatively lax, hardly exceeding already 
achieved targets in the member states (Gehring 1996, p. 21). This, together with 
the setting of maximum targets, was the main reason why countries like Ger-
24 
many, Denmark and the Netherlands, which had already established more 
stringent national systems and had therefore envisaged more ambitious recov-
ery and recycling targets voted against the Directive, when it came to a quali-
fied majority vote in the European Council of Ministers in December 1994. The 
Commission’s environment directorate (DGXI) has recently put forth a draft 
with new recycling targets which aim to increase the total target to 75% by 2006 
with mimum targets for each packaging material to be increased to 45% (ENDS 
1999). Whether these more ambitious targets will become reality, remains to be 
seen, however. 
To sum up, the European Union and many of its member states have fol-
lowed the German way of prioritising recycling over packaging waste avoid-
ance. Associations similar to DSD were set up in other member states and in 
this respect DSD really is a prime example for a successful VA. That this success 
will translate into substantial environmental improvements at the EU level is 
rather unlikely, however. Significant reductions in the consumption of packages 
and the accompanying resource and energy savings are not to be expected. 
Worse still, many provisions in the Directive are hardly stringent and encour-
age incineration of waste packages at the expense of recycling. Similarly, while 
associations in other member states resemble the DSD, very often they are faced 
with much laxer targets for both collection and recycling of packaging waste 
(for more detail, see Brisson 1994). 
 
 
25 
CONCLUSION 
If DSD fulfils most conditions for a successful VA, why does this success not 
translate into substantial environmental improvements? The answer is that the 
very idea of German packaging waste management is misguided. Instead of 
prioritising waste avoidance as actually demanded by §4 of the Product Recy-
cling and Waste Management Act and in spite of solemn declarations in 
Sonntagsreden (cheap talk on special occasions) to the contrary, the system’s fo-
cus is on waste recycling where avoidance can at best come about as an indirect 
effect. The environmental effect is therefore inferior to what a waste manage-
ment policy with priority on avoidance could achieve: instead of the full re-
source and energy saving that would follow from waste avoidance, only part of 
the embodied resources and energy can be recovered with recycling and further 
resources and energy are consumed in the process of collection, sorting and re-
covering. There is an important lesson here for the assessment of VAs: even the 
best VA that fulfils all the conditions for success might achieve inferior envi-
ronmental effects if its inherent logic is misguided from an environmental per-
spective. Most conditions for a successful VA one can find in the literature are 
procedure-oriented. They do not pay enough attention to the contents of an 
agreement. It is simply not enough to have monitored, long-term, quantitative, 
non-negotiable targets if the targets themselves are misguided. 
However, the misguided contents might in turn be the consequence of an 
important procedural flaw of the way the DSD was established as a VA. Bizer 
and Jülich (1999, p. 62, added emphasis) conclude from an examination of sev-
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eral Dutch and German VAs that ‘participation of all legitimate and relevant 
actors in the negotiation and implementation process is likely to be positively 
related to higher environmental effectiveness. An early and adequate discussion 
of the environmental issues that involves all relevant parties helps to define the 
environmental problem and eventually the content of the agreement’. If one 
regards environmental groups as legitimate and relevant actors for packaging 
waste management, then it was exactly their involvement and impact upon the 
content of the agreement that was missing. From the beginning, environmental 
pressure groups and the opposition Social Democratic and Green parties were 
sceptical towards the DSD’s priority of recycling over avoidance, but the then 
ruling Christian Democrat and Liberal parties together with the packaging in-
dustry deliberately ignored calls for greater emphasis on waste avoidance. In 
the DSD’s board of trustees no environmental groups are represented. A con-
sumer interest group left the board early on as it did not see its interests repre-
sented (Rennings et al. 1996, p. 231). 
The DSD has by now very well established itself in Germany. Many of the 
initial problems such as insufficient and horrendously expensive facilities for 
plastics recycling or the already mentioned dumping of German recycled paper 
in other EU countries or South East Asia have now been solved. They have been 
what is called children’s diseases (Kinderkrankheiten) in German: initial problems 
fading away after a while. The system is now in the process of realising its full 
innovative potential with automatic sorting technologies and refined recycling 
methods. However, this will not change its inherent logic which gives priority 
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to recycling over avoidance. Indeed, the better the DSD establishes itself, the 
more will this misguided priority lock itself in. The now ruling Social Democ-
ratic and Green parties have all but given up on any plans to reverse this prior-
ity, which provides a case in point. That many of the EU countries are following 
the same path is good news for DSD, but bad news for environmentalists who 
want to see substantial reductions in resource and energy use in the packaging 
sector that could only come about if the same innovative potential that is now 
being realised in the recycling sector was available for the avoidance of waste as 
well. 
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Table 1. Recovery quota according to the German Packaging Ordinance. 
 
 1/1/1993 1/7/1995 1/1/1996 1/1/1999 
glass 42% 72% 70% 75% 
tinplate 26% 72% 70% 75% 
aluminium 18% 72% 50% 60% 
paper/ 
cardboard 
18% 64% 60% 70% 
plastic 9% 64% 50% 60% 
other composite 6% 64% 50% 60% 
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Table 2. Costs of the DSD. 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total cost (bn DM) 3.1 3.4 4 3.9 4 3.9 
 
Source: DSD (various years). 
